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RECONSTRUCTION OF AUTOMOBILE
ACCIDENTS THROUGH LAY AND
SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY
Adrian P. Schoone* and
Sherin Schapiro**
I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF DISCUSSION
Perhaps the most imposing responsibilty confronting the attorney
participating in litigation arising out of motor vehicle collisions is that
of marshaling facts. All too frequently the operators involved are dead
or have no recollection of the event at the time of trial. In other cases,
the parties' interest in the outcome makes their testimony incredulous.
Often complicating the situation is the total absence of impartial thirdparty witnesses. To supply the missing evidentiary links in the chain
of proof, practitioners are turning more and more to the inferences to
be drawn from the physical facts left in the wake of the wreckage. The
popular term applied to this investigative process is "accident reconstruction."'
The objective of this article is to outline reported decisions in
Wisconsin and other jurisdictions wherein the process has been invoked
by the trial lawyer-irrespective of the ruling by the court upon the
proffered testimony. Effort has been made to catalogue the fruits of
the research into topical, and, hopefully, functional subdivisions, both
as to subject of testimony and capacity of witness, so that the pressured
practitioner may readily determine what authorities obtain upon the
point of proof he seeks to present. Emphasis is on Wisconsin law because that is the arena of the writers, and not because the reconstruction process has been more utilized here. It has not. And if this writing
succeeds in encouraging some few lawyers-and judges-to make more
judicious use of physical facts in the determination of liability, it will
have been worth the effort expended.
Earlier scribes seemed to predict an expanding use of reconstruction opportunities. 2 The recent decisions would accord with this; even
3

those from Wisconsin.

*Editor-in-Chief, Marquette Law Review, 1958-59; Practicing Attorney, La
France, Thompson, Greenquist, Evans & Dye, Racine, Wisconsin.
** Associate Editor, Marquette Law Review, 1963-64.
1 The term is used, for example, in 10 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FAcTs Reconstruction
of Accident 138 (1961).
2 Reath, Scientific Data and Expert Opinion-Its Use in Automobile Accident
Cases, 24 INs. COUNSEL J. 99 (1957) ; Parker, Automobile Accident Analysis
by Expert Witness, 44 VA. L. REv. 799 (1958).
3 At the time this paper was about to go to press, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
had just rendered its opinion in Kutzel v. State Farm Mit. Auto. Ins. Co., 20
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FACTS SUSCEPTIBLE OF PROOF THROUGH OBSERVATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION

Lawyers attempting to cope with the limitations of proof inherent in
violent collisions-where those surviving often cannot remember "how
it happened"-do admittedly have one boon in Wisconsin. The expansion of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur4 into the field of auto negligence law now assists many attorneys in making a prima facie case
out of the type of factual situation once thought to give rise to nothing
more than sheer speculation. 5 But often the elements essential to the
invocation of the doctrine are lacking. Or, the lawyer may wish to
counter damaging testimony with what he believes to be appropriate
deductions or inductions from the physical evidence discovered at
the scene of the alleged tort. What use can be made of the observations
of those at the scene of the impact, whether trained in reconstruction
or not, is herein detailed.6
A. Speed of Vehicle
It is to state the obvious to say that the basic inquiry in any collision
involving a moving vehicle concerns its speed prior to and at impact.
The differences in estimates of their respective speeds by adverse
parties would, in many cases, be amusing if the stakes involved were
not so high. One hoary assumption which has crept into too many trials
is that which immediately infers zephyr-like speed in miles per hour
from extensive property damage, without considering the effect of the
weight of the vehicle upon its momentum.7 The Wisconsin Supreme
Court has dispelled this misconception recently.8
Wis. 2d 588, N.W. 2d (1963), wherein the court indicated, to these
writers, some disposition to permit effective use of reconstructive witnesses,
upon the laying of proper foundation for their testimony. More will be said

in the text of this article of Kuzel, supra.

Fully analyzed, as most Wisconsin lawyers know, in Ghiardi, Res. Ipsa Loquitur, 39 MARQ. L. REV. 361 (1955).
5 Consider the course charted by the following: Baars v. Benda, 249 Wis. 65,
23 N.W. 2d 477 (1947) ; Wis. Tel. Co. v. Matson, 256 Wis. 304, 41 N.W. 2d
268 (1950) ; Mayer v. Boynton Cab Co., 267 Wis. 486, 66 N.W. 2d 136 (1954) ;
Modl v. Nat. Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 272 Wis. 650, 76 N.W. 2d
599 (1956) ; Wood v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 273 Wis. 93, 76 N.W. 2d 610 (1956) ;
Henthorn v. M.G.C. Corp., 1 Wis 2d 180, 83 NW. 2d 759 (1957); Poole v.
St. Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 65, 95 N.W. 2d 799 (1959).
GAuthorities pertaining to the topics discussed hereunder in the text include:
Annots., 77 A.L.R. 2d 580, 605 (1961-point of impact and speed; 66 A.L.R.
2d 1048 (1959)-point of impact; 38 A.L.R. 2d 13 (1954)-cause of accident;
33 A.L.R. 2d 1250 (1954)-whether vehicle moving; 156 A.L.R. 382 (1945)speed; 10 AM. JuR. PROOF OF FAcrs Reconstruction of Accident 137 (1961);
9 C BLASHFIELD, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRAcrICE §6311 et seg.
(1954); Reath, Scientific Data and Expert Opinion-Its Use in Automobile
Accident Cases, 24 INs. COUNSEL J. 99 (1957) ; 25 INs. COUNSEL J. 439 (1958) ;
Parker, Automobile Accident Analysis by Expert Witness, 44 VA. L. REV.
799 (1958).
7More tickling, but less likely to creep into the trial records, what with the
popularity of discovery examinations, is the sincere contention of some drivers
that their vehicle increased in speed upon the application of brakes on ice.
The law of inertia is not universally appreciated.
s Baker v. Herman Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 597, 601, 117 N.W. 2d 725, 728
4

LAY AND SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY

To counter extravagant expressions of speed, the careful lawyer
must be familiar with the rules of evidence applicable to such testimony. They are present in abundance in the reported cases. The
succeeding discussion differentiates between witnesses viewing the collision and those not viewing it, but observing either the vehicles prior
thereto or the effects of impact. As indicated in the Introduction, the
dichotomy of discussion distinguishes between the testimony of the
untrained layman, the law enforcement official steeped in practical
experience, the scientifically tutored engineer or physicist, and other
types of witnesses.
1. Lay witnesses
a. View of Collision
(1) Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Supreme Court many years ago ruled against the
admissibility of vague statements to the effect that a vehicle was "going
fast" or "real fast" or "was speeding" at the time of collision. 9 The
court later imposed on such indefinite description the requirement that
it be coupled with a certain speed in miles per hour, made by a person
experienced in driving cars. 10 When the witness was able to express
a miles per hour estimate, irrespective of limitations on the view, "it
was receivable and for the jury to give it such weight as they saw fit.","
This is true even though the vehicle passed at a right angle to the
witness some six hundred to nine hundred feet away. 1 2 But no useful
estimate can be made from a fleeting glance when the car is fifteen
feet away from the witness. 13
A guidepost in Wisconsin law has been the bar against estimates
made by occupants of vehicles approaching from the opposite direction
of the vehicle being gauged.' 4 But if the witness is in a stationary
position at the time of his estimate, apparently his estimate of closure
speed is admissible. 15
(2) Other Jurisdictions
Most courts do insist that a witness have a reasonable length of
(1962), where Justice Currie said: ". . . We take judicial notice of the fact
that just prior to the collision the truck had a momentum equal to the product
of its mass and velocity . . ."; cf. the result in Rubach v. Prahl, 190 Wis.
421, 209 N.W. 670 (1926).
9 Ronning v. State, 184 Wis. 651, 200 N.W. 394 (1924).
10 Gerbing v. McDonald, 201 Wis. 214, 229 N.W. 860 (1930).
11 Benedict v. Berg, 229 Wis. 1, 6, 281 N.W. 650 (1938).
12Fox v. Kaminsky, 239 Wis. 559, 2 N.W. 2d 199 (1942).
13 Culver v. Webb, 244 Wis. 478, 12 N.W. 2d 731 (1944); but compare Albrecht
v. Tradewell, 271 Wis. 303, 73 N.W. 2d 408 (1955).
'2 Fessler v. Northwestern Nat. Casualty Co., 265 Wis. 14, 60 N.W. 2d 387
(1953) ; Maccaux v. Princl, 3 Wis. 2d 44, 87 N.W. 2d 772 (1958).
"S Millay v. Milw. Auto. Ins. Co., 19 Wis. 2d 330, 120 N.W. 2d 103 (1962. Cf.
Dahinden v. Milw. E. R. & L. Co., 169 Wis. 1, 171 N.W. 669 (1919).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

time within which to make his observation as to speed before his
opinion is admissible.' 6 But that opportunity need be but fleeting to
satisfy some tribunals. 17
Unlike the Wisconsin bar of vagueness, a description that a vehicle
moved as a "flash of yellow," has been admitted as denoting great
speed.' And occasionally a mere "guess" is received, 19 under the frustrating basis that the limitation of view goes to the weight, rather than
admissibilty.
A case that provides the rationale for permitting estimates of speed
made within a frame of references comprised of fixed objects, is
Birnbaum v. Kirchner.20 Not every court prohibits estimates of closure
21
speed made from moving vehicles.
b. No View of Collision
This category distinguishes between estimates of speed based upon
observation made prior to the collision, and those predicated upon the
aftermath of the impact.
(1)

Wisconsin
(a) Travel Prior to Collision
In an early case, the court said that admission of an estimate of
speed of a truck when traveling on a different street prior to the collision was not prejudicial. 2 2 But a different result was soon reached in a
manslaughter case. Where the physical damage to the cars was great,
there was no error in permitting estimates of ipeed made near, but
24
not at, the scene of the collision.
Where a defendant tried to show his reduced speed through observation of his car by a witness who apparently saw it one-fourth
of a mile from the point of impact and then heard the crash, the trial
2
court properly rejected the offer as "too remote." 1
An unusual offer of proof was recently made by a plaintiff who
wished to prove the defendant's vehicle was traveling at a high rate
of speed, through the tesimony of a person reputedly experienced in
"6Kristufek v. Rapp, 154 Neb. 708, 47 N.W. 2d 923 (1951) ; Peake v. Omaha
Cold Storage Co., 158 Neb. 676, 64 N.W. 2d 470( 1954).
17 Koutsky v. Grabowski, 150 Neb. 508, 34 N.W. 2d 893 (1948)-driver of lead
car testified as to speed based on glance in rear view mirror. Wisconsin has
permitted the same thing. Hibner v. Landauer, 18 Wis. 2d 451, 118 N.W. 2d
873 (1962).
' 8 Acker v. Columbus & Southern Ohio Elec. Co., 42 OHio L. ABS. 430, 60 N.E.
2d 932 (1944).
19 Schwenger v. Gaither, 87 Cal. App. 2d 913, 198 P. 2d 108 (1948); Kurn v.
Counts, 247 Ala. 129, 22 So. 2d 725 (1945). Contra, Frank v. Stiegler, 250
Minn. 447, 84 N.W. 2d 912 (1957).
20337 Ill. App. 25, 85 N.E. 2d 191 (1949).
"1 Lewis v. Miller, 119 Neb. 765, 230 N.W. 769 (1930).
"2Thomas v. Lockwood Oil Co., 178 Wis. 599, 190 N.W. 559 (1922).

2Ronning v. State, 184 Wis. 651, 200 N.W. 394 (1924).
24 Rubach v. Prahl, 190 Wis. 421, 209 N.W. 670 (1926).
25 Neumann v. Evans, 272 Wis. 579, 76 N.W. 2d 322 (1955).
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listening to vehicles on the highway. Not surprisingly the court
excluded such evidence as conjectural.

(b)

2

Effects of Collision

Thomas v. Lockwood Oil Co. 2 7 permits proof of the distance run

by a vehicle after impact. Where a defendant driver traveled twelve
feet after collision with the emergency brake applied, negligence was
28
found as a matter of law, for he stated he could have easily stopped.
Negligent speed as a matter of law, was also found, setting aside
a jury verdict, where car No. 1 was driving east with a weight of 2200
pounds and car No. 2, weighing 3800 pounds and headed south, struck
No. 1, deflecting No. 1 from its easterly course and moving it 74 feet
south at a right angle to its original path. Car No. 2 came to a stop 25
feet south of the place of collision. The court deemed the uncontroverted physical results of the collision to be so strong and convincing
29
as to control the case.
A comparatively recent case in which no eyewitnesses to the accident
could be located, and where the results of the accident were relied
upon to reconstruct the actions of the vehicle prior to impact, is
Evien v. Packer City Transit Lines.30 There Justice Hallows stated:
When several inferences may reasonably be drawn from
credible evidence and one of which will support a claim or contention of any party and the others will not, the rule is that the
proper inference to be drawn is for the jury. Dachelet v. Home
Mut. Casualty Co. (1951), 258 Wis. 413, 46 N.W. (2d) 331.
While there is no evidence of the position of the motor vehicles
just prior to the impact, except which may be inferred from the
position of the motor vehicles, their cargoes, and the debris
after the accident, and there is no direct oral testimony corroborating any inference to be drawn from the physical facts, we
are of the opinion the facts here presented, if anything, a jury
question. The relative positions of the two vehicles and the
debris after the collision cannot conclusively support either
theory because the mechanical results of an accident of this
kind are sometimes very surprising and hard to explain. It seems
to us that in the present case they may be explained fully as
reasonably on the theory that the collision occurred in the west
lane near the center line as in the east lane. In Glatz v. Kroeger
Bros. Co. (1919), 168 Wis. 635, 639, 170 N.W. 934, this court
said such a situation was peculiarly appropriate for the judgment of a jury. See also StandardAccident Ins. Co. v. Runquist
(1932), 209 Wis. 97, 101, 244 N.W. 757.31
And great speed was inferred from the extensive damage to the
? Carstensen v. Faber, 17 Wis. 2d 242, 116 N.W. 2d 161 (1961).
27Thomas v. Lockwood Oil Co., supra note 22.
2s Ortman v. A. Leath & Co., 187 Wis. 616, 205 N.W. 397 (1925).
29 Rubach v. Prahl, 190 Wis. 421, 209 N.W. 670 (1926).
309 Wis. 2d 153, 100 N.W. 2d 580 (1960).
31 Id. at 161-62, 100 N.W. 2d at 586.
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vehicles and the serious injuries to the occupants in Rodenkirch v.
Johnson,32 where it was said:
The jury could reasonably conclude that the speed of the
respondent was great and in excess of 25 miles per hour from
the physical facts and other testimony, especially that the
appellant's car was forced backward over 65 feet, spun around
in the opposite direction, and practically demolished; the respondent's car continued beyond the apparent point of impact some
35 feet in its direct line of force, was turned around, and was
extensively damaged; 33and four people were killed outright and

two seriously injured.

Negligence as to speed was similarly inferred as to the following

3 4
car in a two car collision, in LaVillie v. Gen. Ins. Co.

(2)

Other Jurisdictions
(a) Travel Prior to Collision
Lay witnesses can always testify as to their observations, such as
the length of skidmarks, even though they may not see the impact.3
But, as in Wisconsin, what the ear hears cannot be transposed into a
miles per hour estimate. 6 Conversely, observations of a driver, killed
in the crash, driving "at regular speed" on the way to the point of
7
collision can be described on the witness stand.
A court has permitted an estimate of the speed of a bus fifteen
hundred feet before the place where it struck a vehicle it was trying
to pass. 38 Where other witnesses followed the vehicle and its speed

did not vary, an estimate made two and one-half miles from the scene
was competent.3 9
Witnesses have also been permitted to state that a vehicle in collision was veering back and forth across the center line, even as far
back as 27 miles before the place of impact.40 But other judges recog-

nize one's conduct can change. 41
(b) Effects of Collision
Most courts place restrictions upon attempts of lay witnesses to
gauge the speed of vehicles prior to and at collision from the effects
32 9 Wis. 2d 245, 101 N.W. 2d 83 (1960).
33 Id. at 251, 101 N.W. 2d at 86.
34 17 Wis. 2d 522, 117 N.W. 2d 703 (1962).
-35Grossnickle v. Avery, 96 Ind. App. 479, 152 N.E. 288 (1926).
36 Challinor v. Axton, 246 Ky. 76, 54 S.W. 2d 600 (1932); Haight v. Nelson,
157 Neb. 341, 59 N.W. 2d 576 (1953). Opposite result: Hayungs v. Falk, 238
Iowa 285, 27 N.W. 2d 15 (1947).
3 Arkmo Lumber Co. v. Luckett, 201 Ark. 140, 143 S.W. 2d 1107 (1940).
38 Gabel v. Hanby, 165 Kans. 116, 193 P. 2d 239 (1948); similarly, at six hun-

dred feet Kohl v. Marin, 346 Mich. 693, 78 N.W. 2d 621 (1956).

39

Clay

v. Sammons, 239 S.W. 2d 927 (Ky. App. 1951). Reid v. Humphreys,

210 Md. 178, 122 A. 2d 756 (1956)-two and one-half miles.

4o Briggs v. Burk, 174 Kans. 440, 257 P. 2d 164 (1953). Three-fourths of a mile
was too distant in David Belgore & Co. v. Ryder, 211 F. 2d 855 (8th Cir.
1954), however.
41 Brower v. Quick, 249 Ia. 569, 88 N.W. 2d 120 (1958).
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of the impact. While nonexperts can describe skidmarks, they cannot
base miles per hour speed on their length.4 2 Unsurprisingly, the same
43
objection extends to opinions based on the "roar" of the crash.
Without some proof of qualification, witnesses cannot opine speed
44
from the extent of damage to the vehicles alone.
The mere fact a witness, in the car from which plaintiff had
alighted a split second before collision, was propelled one hundred
feet by the rear end impact, did not permit that witness to testify as
to the defendant's speed. The court held a person with knowledge
of time and distance, and an opportunity to formulate a basis for his
opinion, is competent to estimate speed. But no opportunity was
presented 'in the case.4 5
2. Law Enforcement Witnesses
Perhaps no classification of witness is more often sought as to
the physical facts upon which reconstruction can be predicated than
the law enforcement officer. Usually arriving at the scene of the
collision within a short time after impact, he is by statute in most
states, such as Wisconsin,4 6 obliged to make on official written report
of his observations and the results of his inquiries. No preparation
for trial is truly thorough unless a copy of that report is a part of the
trial lawyer's file.4 7 And detailed interview with the officer may often
reveal his availability and qualifications for testimony beyond mere
observation. The following authorities are at least indicative of the
bounds within which such testimony is admissible.
a. Wisconsin
Only one Wisconsin case has been located in which a law enforcement officer attempted to reconstruct the speed of vehicles in collision.
In Andersen v. Andersen, 48 a two car collision occurred in the center
of the highway. At trial, a traffic officer who had been on the highway
squad for twenty-eight years and had participated in the investigation
of over one thousand accidents, but who had never studied the subject
of physics, was called to the stand. He had not visited the scene of
the accident involved in litigation, but had studied photographs of the
scene and a drawing of the locations of the cars after impact with
skid marks noted thereon. These items had already been received in
Everhart V. Fischer, 75 Ore. 316, 147 Pac. 189 (1915) ; Ward v. Zerzanek, 227
Iowa 918, 289 N.W. 443 (1940).
43 Challinor v. Axton, 246 Ky. 76, 54 S.W. 2d 600 (1932).
44 Williams v. Roche Undertaking Co., 255 Ala. 56,49 So. 2d 902 (1950).
45 Kristufek v. Rapp, 154 Neb. 708, 47 N.W. 2d 923 (1951). To the same effect:
Haight v. Nelson, 157 Neb. 341, 59 N.W. 2d 576 (1953).
46 WIs. STAT. §346.70 (4) (1961).
47 52 Ops. Wis. A=rv GEN. 242 (1963) has helped make such reports more readily available in Wisconsin, by removing them from the status of confidential
records with the law enforcement agencies.
488 Wis. 2d 278, 99 N.W. 2d 190 (1959). Cf. Luetke v. Schmidt-Gaertner Co.,
170 Wis. 590, 176 N.W. 63 (1920).
42
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evidence. The officer then stated, among other things, that in his opinion
the defendant's car must have been going much faster than plaintiff's,
based upon the location and extent of damage.
On appeal, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held the practical experience of the officer was insufficient qualification to enable him to
give an opinion as to the relative speed. 49 But the admission of the
testimony, while error, was not prejudicial.
b. Other Jurisdictions
Mere observation of physical damage by an officer steeped in
practical experience, but short on scientific training, does not permit
him to give an opinion of speed, where the hypothetical question did
not embrace any of the facts occurring prior to impact. 50 But where

an officer on the stand has measured the length of skidmarks at the
scene, and had five and one-half years experience on the highway
patrol, he was permitted to testify whether a driver "was traveling at
an excessive rate of speed." 51 (In Wisconsin, the established admissiability 52 of the Table of Stopping Distances contained in the Wis-

consin's Manual for Motorists, published by the State Motor Vehicle
Department makes any oral testimony as to speed based on skidmarks
alone usually superfluous.)
Some states permit an officer to testify as to the "reasonable speed
in the area" where the collision occurred, and then the speed of the
53
drivers, where the officer has spent many years of duty in that area.
Where a witness had twenty-six years experience in a traffic
bureau and received training at the Northwestern University Traffic
Institute, he was permitted to testify as to speed based on the surface
of the roadway, the damage to the vehicles, and seventy-five feet of
skidmarks. 54 And in another case, two officers had attended a four
and one-half month course in traffic administration, experimented
with various cars on various surfaces, conducted 6500 tests, including
49 The court relied on I WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §561, at 963 (2d ed. 1923).
50 Stephanofsky v. Hill, 136 Conn. 379, 71 A. 2d 560 (1950). Same result: Ross

v. Newsome, 289 F. 2d 209 (5th Cir. 1961) ; Baggett v. Allen, 237 Ala. 164,
137 So. 2d 37 (1902) ; Robert v. Koons, 230 Iowa 92, 296 N.W. 811 (1941).
51Johnson v. Battles, 255 Ala. 624, 52 So. 2d 702 (1951). The same testimony
was permitted where the witness had nine years of experience in Ruther v.
Tyra, 139 Wash. 625, 247 P. 2d 964 (1952).
52 See Steffes v. Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 321, 96 N.W. 2d 501
(1959). See also Baker v. Herman Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Wis. 2d 597, 117 N.W.
2d 725 (1962)-brake reaction time.
53 E.g., Ferguson v. Hurford, 132 Colo. 522, 290 P. 2d 229 (1955) ; Beckman v.
Schroeder, 224 Minn. 370, 28 N.W. 2d 629 (1947). Contra, Christ v. Wempe,
219 Md. 627, 150 A. 2d 918 (1959).
54 Continental Oil Co. v. Elias, 307 P. 2d 849 (Okla. 1957). Similarly: Foreman v. Heinz, 185 Kans. 715, 347 P. 2d 451; Johnson v. Huskey, 186
Kans. 282, 350 P. 2d 14 (1960) ; Etheridge v. Hooper, 104 Ga. App. 227, 121
S.E. 2d 323 (1961) ; Central Container Corp. v. Westbrook, 105 Ga. App. 855,
126 S.E. 2d 264 (1962). Contra, Reall v. Deiriggi, 127 W.Va. 662, 34 S.E. 2d
253 (1945) ; Jowers v. Dauphin, 237 Ala. 567, 143 So. 2d 167 (1962) ; B-Line
Cab Co. v. Hampton, 247 S.W. 2d 34 (Ky. App. 1952).
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some at the scene. From these tests and their other experience in
determining coefficients of friction, they were permitted to state that
the critical speed of the vehicle in leaving the curve was 80.52 m.p.h.
On appeal, the court gave great deference to the discretion of the
trial court, but indicated it would have reversed, had the testimony
been the only evidence from which the jury could determine speed. 55
The observation of wreckage of the vehicles alone is not a sufficient
basis for the estimate of speed, no matter how experienced the officers.56
But where a captain of the Nebraska State Patrol had examined the
paving at the scene, the kind of cars, and studied photos of the scene,
and was asked a hypothetical question as to speed based on the type
cars, their wheel base, their course, the grade, the condition of the
intersection at the time, the position of the cars after the accident,
the damage to them as reflected in the photos, and twenty-two feet
of skidmarks, the estimate of speed was permitted. 57
And just when an opinion as to speed based exclusively upon the
damage observed will not be permitted is indicated by Tyndall v. Harvey G. Hines Co.5s There a state highway patrolman came to the scene
where the plaintiff pedestrian had been injured and his sister killed by
an ice cream truck. At trial the officer testified as to his observations,
and then, over defendant's objection, answered a hypothetical question
as to speed. His answer was derived from the distance of the bodies
from the point of impact and other markings at the scene.
On defendant's appeal, the North Carolina Appellate Court acknowledged that generally a witness must concern himself with facts,
and his opinions are to be confined to questions of art, science or skill.
It then said:
But this rule is too narrow to meet the needs of everyday life and to protect the rights of citizens in courts of justice.
It is practically impossible to give intelligible evidence as to some
facts except through the medium of opinion.59
However, the court considered that because the witness had estimated speed from readily observable conditions at the scene, the
ordinary layman could readily understand and appreciate what the
witness had seen. Hence, the jury was as well qualified to draw the
inferences from such facts as the witness, and his testimony was
prejudicial to the defendant.
55
5

Myers v. Korbly, 103 So. 2d 215 (Fla. App. 1958).

6 Redding

v. Independent Contracting Co., 333 S.W. 2d 269 (Ky. App. 1960);

Flores v. Barlow, 354 S.W. 2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Wilkinson v.

Martin, 353 P. 2d 440 (Wash. 1960). Contra, Cross v. Estate of Patch, 123
57

Vt. 11, 178 A. 2d 393 (1961).
Beggs v. Gottsch, 173 Neb. 15, 112 N.W. 2d 396 (1961).

59

Id., 39 S.E. 2d at 829.

58 226 N.C. 620, 39 S.E. 2d 828 (1946).
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3. "Scientific Expert" Witnesses
We have seen that many jurisdictions quite readily permit the
investigating officer to give his opinion of speed based upon his observations at the scene of impact, particularly where identifiable
skidmarks were present. Far less harmony prevails in the case of
the witness trained in the laws of mechanics, dynamics, inertia, and,
in short, the laws of energy and motion, who attempts to reconstruct
the events prior to impact as well as thereafter from the fragmentary
evidence in the record at the time he testifies. The following discussion
regarding reconstruction of speed, and the succeeding matters considered in which "expert" testimony was or was not allowed in the
decided cases do reflect a trend. Such opinion evidence will be admitted if the expert's qualifications are clearly established as material
to the subject matter of his testimony, sufficient physical evidence
is in the record upon which an opinion can be predicated, and that
60
opinion is not in conflict with the common experience of mankind.
a. Wisconsin
Thirty years ago Goetz v. Herzog61 was decided. There the plaintiff sued for the alleged wrongful death of her husband whose car
collided with a cab owned by one of the defendants. The jury found
both drivers negligent, and plaintiff appealed from the judgment for
the defendants. One of her bases for requesting reversal was the
refusal of the trial court to permit a qualified teacher of physics to
state the law of physics applicable to the imparting of force. This offer
of proof was rejected on the ground the witness had no experience
with colliding automobiles. The purpose of the offered testimony was
to refute the inference that defendants' car could not been traveling
as fast as the deceased's because if it had been, its inertia would have
carried it beyond'the point of impact. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
affirmed the-trial court, stating:
The law [of imparted force] is doubtless as well known,
as much a matter of common knowledge, as the law of inertia,
the contended effect of which the proffered evidence was offered
to refute. The effect of it was as much a proper subject of argument without proof as was the effect of the law of inertia of
which there was no proof. If not as well understood by the
jury as the law of inertia, its effect was readily subject to illustration in argument.
We perceive no error in the rejection of
62
the testimony.

In the later case of Anderson v. Eggert,63 the court said it did not
wish to imply that the trial court in Goetz would have committed error
by admitting the testimony of the teacher of physics.
60 See 10 AM. JOR. PROOF OF FAcrs Reconstruction of Accident 144 (1961).
61210 Wis. 494, 246 N.W. 573 (1933).

62

Id. at 498, 246 N.W. at 574.

63234 Wis. 348, 360, 291 N.W. 365 (1940)-more fully discussed at p. 358.
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b. Other Jurisdictions
Mere examination of the automobiles by a professional engineer
several days after the accident is not a sufficient basis upon which to
determine the relative speeds of the two vehicles. 64 But where a witness with an M.A. in civil engineering was asked to assume as true
the testimony of a motorman locating point of impact and the fact
that at the time of collision the power of the bus was released and its
brakes applied, and investigating officers had previously testified as
to.the place where it came to a stop, the engineer, using a "coefficient
of friction" formula, was permitted to testify as to the speed of the
streetcar. His opinion of 39 m.p.h. was the only testimony contradicting the 25 m.p.h. estimate of defendant's motorman. On appeal by
defendant to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Justice Youngdahl, in
what is now one of the leading opinions in the matter of expert testimony
regarding speed, held the fact the engineer had not operated a street
car, and was unfamiliar with its weight and braking apparatus, was
65
not a bar to his expression of opinion.
Any person of ordinary ability and intelligence having the
means or opportunity of observation is competent to testify to
the rate of speed at which an automobile, locomotive, or other
object was moving at a given time. Such estimate of speed is
generally viewed as a matter of common observation rather than
expert opinion. Because speed is generally not considered a
matter of expert opinion, it does not mean that experts cannot
testify to it, but merely that when they do their testimony is
received not as an exception to the opinion evidence rule made
in cases calling for expert evidence, but under the exception
existing when it is impossible to reproduce data. 20 Am. Jur.,
Evidence, §805.16
With this breakthrough, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in the later
case of Storbakken v. Soderberg,6 7 found no objection in the testimony
by a civil engineer as to speed at impact using the "Law of Conservation and Momentum." The witness conducted tests at the scene, and
was given all facts deemed pertinent in a hypothetical question which
is included in the footnotes.6 The court held the hypothesis need not
64 Warren v. Hynes, 4 'Wash. 2d 128, 102 P. 2d 691 (1940).

65 Moeller v. St. Paul City Ry. Co., 218 Minn. 353, 16 N.W. 2d 289 (1944).
66 Id., 16 N.W. 2d at 295.
67246 Minn. 434, 75 N.W. 2d 496 (1956).
68 Id., 75 N.W. 2d at 499:

.1 ask you to assume these following facts: that an automobile

weighing approximately 3435 pounds, with a load of 340 pounds including
the driver, is traveling northward on a hard-packed gravel surface roadway
of clay and dirt; also assume that this automobile is slowing down for
an intersection located approximately a hundred and fifty to a hundred
and seventy-five feet north by intermittently applying the brakes until the
wheels commence to slide a total of three times; assuming further that
after this process the driver of this automobile totally applies his brakes
so that the four wheels are sliding a distance of fifty to fifty-five feet to
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include all testimony in the record, but substantially all undisputed
"

facts relating to the subject matter of the opinion.69
A more recent case illustrates the importance of including no facts
not in evidence, such as an assumption the defendant was making a
right turn at time of collision, where no prior testimony substantiated
it.7O The court relied on the following rule:
. . . no matter how skilled or experienced the witness may
be, he will not be permitted to guess or to state a judgment
based on mere conjecture; in other words, the factual
founda71
tion for the expert opinion must not be nebulous.
The value of reconstructive testimony in an action for wrongful
death, with no surviving eyewitnesses, is shown by Leeper v. Thornton.72 There, defendant introduced a safety engineer who began his
investigation of the collision one and one-half years after it occurred.
He based his opinions on what evidence was then visible at the scene
and the remains of the two cars in a salvage yard. grom this, he was
permitted to state that the vehicle of plaintiff's deceased was traveling
faster at impact, and his evidence supported a jury verdict for the
defense.
But where two plaintiffs, involved in a two-car head-on collision,
attempted to prove by expert testimony that defendant had the "last
clear chance" to avoid the crash, but could not because of excessive
speed, their efforts were thwarted. 73 The plaintiffs had no recollection
of events prior to impact, and employed Clarence S. Bruce, a "traffic
accident analyst," with thirty years experience in the automotive
a point in the northeast quarter of the intersection of these roadways
where the car and the truck came into collision; assuming also that the
weight of the truck with the load was 15,040 pounds and that the truck
had been traveling in an easterly direction and had approached the automobile approximately at right angles; assuming also that the left front
of the automobile and the right front of the truck collided; and further
assuming that after the collision the automobile traveled in a northerly
direction and came to rest in the ditch on the east side of the road, with
the rear wheels approximately 16 feet four inches north from the north
line of the township road and the front left wheels of the car approximately 12 feet three inches east from the east shoulder of the gravel
road on Which the car had been traveling; that the left front wheel of
the automobile was damaged in the collision; and that the direction of
travel of the truck was changed from an easterly direction to a northerly
direction and that the truck came to rest on its right side, with the center
of the truck approximately 22 feet north from the point of impact. Now,
on the basis of those assumed facts which have been given to you
previously, Mr. Johnson, have you been able to make, to formulate, to
form an opinion as to speed of the automobile at these various times
(A) when the driver of the automobile first commenced to apply the
brakes intermittently? Have you formed an opinion as to the speed of the
automobile at that point ?"
69 Quoting 2 WIGmORE, EVIDEFCE §682 (b) (3d ed. 1940).
70 Waller v. So. Cal. Gas Co., 107 Cal. App. 747, 339 P. 2d 577 (1959).
71 32 C.J.S. Evidence §522, at 220 (1942).
72 86 Ariz. 242, 344 P. 2d 1101 (1959).
7
3 Kale v. Douthitt, 274 F. 2d 476 (4th Cir. 1960).
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laboratory at the National Bureau of Standards and author of Table
of Stopping Distances and Reaction Time used in many states. Bruce
studied the scene of the accident the day before trial which was
eighteen months after the collision. He also examined photographs
earlier introduced into evidence showing the highway, skidmarks-and
debris at the scene, and the damaged vehicles on opposite shoulders
of the road. He was then asked to determine defendant's speed at the
time he applied his brakes. 74 Objection due to the omission of material
facts such as the exact weight of the drivers, the angle of incline, and
the nature and condition of the tires and the road surface, was sustained. The plaintiffs thus were "out of court," for the court of appeals felt that
Experience has shown the futility of attempted demonstration in accident cases; there are too many varying factors.
Among these variants we may class indefinite rate of speed,
condition of the highway, judgment or lack thereof in the
drivers, a direct blow or a glancing one, and the balance or
equilibrium of each car at the time of impact.75
Similar reasoning has prevented an "accidentologist," one Alvin
Doyle of Baton Rouge, La., with previous experience testifying in
courts of twelve states" from expressing opinion as to speed, in'one
of the latest cases on the subject.Y7 The commendable feature of the
decision is the dissent:
The majority opinion suggests that it would invade the
province of the jury to admit expert testimony in automobile
cases. But this reasoning begs the question, because there are
many instances where expert opinion has been permitted to
aid the jury. This would include medical questions of causation, the testimony of handwriting experts, ballistics experts,
property appraisers. Nor will such evidence necessarily turn
74 The following assumptions were included in the question:

"... (1) a highway approximately 21 feet wide with lanes about 10 feet

wide, relatively level and straight, with a slight upgrade toward the north;
(2) hard-surface asphalt pavement, known as F-1 black top; (3) skid
marks 50 feet in length made by the Douthitt car approaching from the
north; (4) the Kale car approaching from the south came into the southbound lane of traffic at a speed between 45 and 55 miles an hour; (5) the
vehicles collided at a point indicated in the photographs by the skid

marks and debris; (6) the Kale car came to rest against a bank 5 feet
10 inches from the edge of the east shoulder, which is 11 feet and 10
inches wide; (7) the Douthitt car came to rest either at a point 10 inches
west of the white center line, or on the west shoulder as shown in the
photograph. Q. Can you, with those statements which I have given you,
estimate mathematically the speed at which the Chrysler Imperial (Douthitt's car) was travelling at the time the deceleration of that vehicle began?
"A. Yes, sir."

75 274 F. 2d at 483, quoting Fishman v. Silva, 116 Cal. App. 1, 2 P. 2d 473, 474

(1931).
His testimony was admitted, for example, in Sinclair v. Cook, 128 So. 2d
247 (La. App. 1961); Fendlason v. Allstate Ins. Co., 136 So. 2d 814 (La.
7 App. 1961).
7 Hagan Storm Fence Co. v. Edwards, 148 So. 2d 693 (Miss. 1963).
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into a clash of partisan experts. The automotive engineer is not
subject to the same partisan pressures to which an attending
physician may be subject. Moreover, the ability to apply the
laws of motion is distinctly much more of an exact science than
the art of expressing an opinion on a question of medical causation. In the search for truth, the court should permit the use
of adequately qualified experts in any area where scientific
evaluation would be of assistance to the jury. Yet, unfortunately,
the controlling opinion rejects the testimony of an experienced,
qualified automotive engineer where there are no available eyewitnesses.
.

.

. it seems to us that where there are no eyewitnesses

and in fact there is nothing on which the jury could reasonably base their decision, and where the physical evidence leaves
the question of what happened unexplained, a jury of ordinary,
everyday citizens would welcome the opinion of someone with
superior knowledge and experience. We do not mean to say
such testimony should be permitted in every case. It should be
left to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of
sound discretion, it should determine (a) that the witness is
qualified by training and experience or otherwise; (b) his
evidence would be of benefit to the jury, and (c) such evidence
is necessary for the jury to have a better understanding of
the facts presented to it.
[Emphasis supplied.]78
Needless to say, a scientific expert is sometimes permitted to
79
estimate speed from the length of observable skidmarks.
4. Other Witnesses
In isolated cases, one can find witnesses of varied backgrounds
giving estimates of speeds. Decisions immediately after the advent
of the automobile reveal little restrictions on such testimony.80 Occasionally, mechanics and surgeons were permitted to opine speed based
on damage to the car and its occupants."' Much deference seems
8 2
accorded to the trial court in allowing the testimony of garagemen
But mere experience in driving trucks does not qualify a witness as
an expert on speed

S3

And no witness, irrespective of his qualifications, should predicate
781d.,
148 So. 2d at 700.
79 Monday v. Millsaps, 264 S.W. 2d 6 (Tenn. App. 1953); In re Armstrong
Estate, 181 Kans. 171, 311 P. 2d 281 (1957).
80 E.g., Heidner v. Germscheid, 41 S.Dak. 430, 171 N.W. 208 (1919)-witnesses
were familiar with the handling of cars and had examined scene.
s1 McCarthy v. Souther, 83 N.H. 29, 137 Atl. 445 (1927) ; contra, as to testimony
of mechanic: Faris v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 48 Idaho 312, 282 Pac.
72 (1929) ; Johnston v. Peairs, 117 Cal. App. 208, 3 P. 2d 617 (1931) ; Roberts
v. Koons, 230 Iowa 92, 296 N.W. 811 (1941); Oyster v. Dye, 7 Wash. 2d
674, 110 P. 2d 863 (1941).
82 See Harrington v. Travers, 288 Mass. 156, 192 N.E. 495 (1934); Comstock
v. Smith, 183 Wash. 94, 48 P. 2d 255 (1935) ; Linde v. Emmick, 16 Cal. App.
676, 61 P. 2d 338 (1936).
83 Wisniewski v. Weinstock, 130 N.J. L. 58, 31 A. 2d 401 (1943).
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his opinion on such facts as are beyond his acknowledged ability to com4
prehend and evaluate.
B. Direction of Travel
1. Lay Witnesses
As might be expected there is paucity of reported cases in which
untrained persons were permitted to testify as to the direction and
path of travel of vehicles before and after collision. Only observations
of lay persons going to the fact of direction seem permitted. 5
2. Law Enforcement Witnesses
a. Wisconsin
We have previously discussed Andersen v. Andersen"' where the
experienced traffic officer testified although not present at the scene. In
addition to giving opinion as to relative speeds, the witness testified to a
reasonable certainty that the defendant car was sliding sideways in
the south lane, with its front end facing the north lane, at time of
collision. All of his opinions were inadmissable, but their reception
not prejudicial error in that case.
b. Other Jurisdictions
In some of the cases, it appears that the investigating officer is
permitted to testify as to the maneuvers of the vehicles under the
guise of reporting the presence and nature of skidmarks.8 7 Much
deference is extended to the discretion of the trial court in permitting
the officer to comment on direction of travel after collision. 8 But the
appellate court will be zealous to void opinions based on observations
coupled with what bystanders told the investigating officer 8 9
A lead case permitting wide latitude in the testimony of a highway
patrolman investigating the collision of two tractor-trailers is Wells
Truckways v. Cebrian.90 There, based on the location of the trucks
after impact, tire tracks and gauge marks, and the nature and extent
of damage, the witness was permitted to state that the defendant
truck was "angling" at a 200 angle at collision, and that such angulation would have projected the trailer into plaintiff's lane for 23 feet
prior to impact. The court on appeal emphasized the witness's qualifications-100 such investigations in 14 years of patrol work. Because
the circumstantial evidence in the record was not self-explanatory to
84
85

86
87

Whittaker v. Van Fossan, 297 F. 2d 245 (4th Cir. 1961).
See, for example, Lambert v. Coronna, 206 N.C. 616, 175 S.E. 303 (1934),
where an eye witness was permitted to state that skid-marks observed were
in the direction the vehicle was headed.

Note 48 supra.

Forexample, Bybee Bros. v. Imes, 288 Ky. 1, 155 S.W. 2d 492 (1941).

88
89 Ruther v. Tyra, 207 Okda. 112, 247 P. 2d 964 (1952).

aben v. Lee, 260 P. 2d 1064 (Okla. 1953), citing 20 AxMi. JuR. Evidence §817

(1939). See also L. C. McNelley v. D-A Lubricant, Inc., 368 P. 2d 555 (Colo.

1962).
90 122 Cal. App. 666, 265 P. 2d 557 (1954).
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the layman, the patrolman's opinion was considered of assistance to
the jury in drawing correct inferences from the physical facts.
The Iowa Supreme Court appears to have now adopted this reasoning.91
Sometimes an investigating officer will chart the direction of
travel of vehicles on the diagram which he prepares for submission
to high authority. If such a drawing includes his conclusions, and no
foundation is laid for its submission, the conclusions are to be deleted
from the diagram before received in evidence. 2 And questions asked
the officer should not be framed in terms of "whether the collision
could have occurred as plaintiff-or defendant-testified" as this in3
vades the province of the jury.
3. "Scientific Expert" Witnesses
The latest Wisconsin case in the field of accident reconstruction
is Kuzel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 94 There the defendant's
insured driver was killed in a two car head-on collision. The testimony
of the investigating officer was to the effect that the presence of dirt
and debris on the highway, as well as skidmarks from the plaintiff
automobile, indicated the impact occurred in defendant's lane, the
south-bound lane, of traffic. There were no skidmarks from the defendant's car. The plaintiff, guest in the other car, and his driver, stated
on trial that prior to impact, defendant's car had invaded their northbound lane, forcing them to swerve to the left into the south-bound
lane.
The only witness called by the defense other than the investigating
officer, was Professor A. H. Easton of the University of Wisconsin.
His initial acquaintance with the case was in November, 1961, three
and one-half years after the collision, when he spent one and one-half
hours at the scene. The only other data available to him were seven
photographs taken by the officer immediately after the collision and
the officer's written report of the accident. In Easton's opinion on trial,
he stated that the car in which plaintiff was a passenger had been
traveling in a path directly in line with its skidmarks for at least 100
feet prior to application of brakes. The skidmarks measured 57 feet
and were all in the lane of defendant's driver. The professor further
opined that defendant's driver had been traveling "more or less
parallel to the center for approximately 50 feet prior to the impact,"
9'Brower v. Quick, 249 Iowa 569, 88 N.W. 2d 120 (1958) ; cf. Nielsen v. Wessels,
247 Iowa 213, 73 N.W. 2d 83 (1955).
Grayson v. Williams, 256 F. 2d 61 (10th Gir. 1958).
93Tidwell v. Davidson, 54 Wash. 2d 75, 338 P. 2d 326 (1959), citing 9 C BLAsHrMIxu, CYCLOPEDIA OF AUTOMOBILE LAW AND PRACTICE §6312, at 508 (1954):
"Expert testimony is not admissible to prove that cars involved in a collision
could not, if struck in the manner and under the circumstances testified to by
other witnesses, have moved or come to rest in the manner testified to."
9Note 3 supra.
92
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and thus had not invaded plaintiff's lane immediately prior to collision.
These opinions were based upon the absence of any "little scuff marks,"
which Easton stated would be left on the highway by any violent
maneuvering of an automobile. The jury apportioned the negligence
of the drivers, with 90% allocated to the driver of the plaintiff, and
10% to the defendant's driver. The trial court held a joint enterprise
obtained between plaintiff and his driver, and the latter's negligence
was imputed to the former. Plaintiff appealed to the Wisconsin
Supreme Court.
Because the expert admitted that the photographs he used in formulating his opinions might have failed to reveal such "scuff marks," and
because the investigating officer had not been asked whether there were
such marks on the pavement, the supreme court felt compelled to
grant a new trial in the interest of justice.
This was done although the plaintiff had not objected to the
expert's testimony in his motion for new trial in the lower court.9 5
The court stated:
Easton based his opinion on the fact that the report of the
investigating officer did not mention any scuff marks. However,
during the course of the trial the defense had two separate
occasions to question the police officer as to whether or not there
were any scuff marks on the highway, and no such questions
were propounded by counsel for the defense.
Since there was no proof of the absence of scuff marks, the
expert's opinion was not found in fact and must fall. This leaves
the jury's finding that Dewey was 90 per cent negligent entirely
unsupported by any credible evidence...9
The importance of laying adequate foundation for the expert
opinion cannot be overemphasized in the light of this decision. More
will be said about the manner of developing expert opinion in a succeeding portion of this article. It should be noted that Kuzel appears
to be one of the few reported decisions in the country in which an
individual schooled in scientific reconstruction, as opposed to those
experienced in towing away the wreckage, attempted to determine the
course of vehicle prior to impact.
4. Other Witnesses
In several cases, mechanics and garagemen have attempted to
chart the course of vehicles in collision.
A garageman has been permitted to state the course likely to have
T
been taken by a vehicle sustaining a bent axle in initial impact.
But, in frequently cited Fishman v. Silva,9" a mechanic who had towed
or repaired an average of 20 wrecked cars per week for nine years,
95 Cf. Wells v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 505, 80 N.W. 2d 380 (1957).
96 Per Justice Dieterich, 20 Wis. 2d 558, 573-74, N.W. 2d(1963).
97 Crampton v. Diame, 224 Ky. 507, 6 S.W. 2d 686 (1928).
98 116 Cal. App. 1, 2 P. 2d 473 (1931).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

could not testify as to the probable course taken by the cars after
impact.
A repairman was able to express his opinion that a car was struck
in the center of the right side and then rolled over, in Earhart v.
Tretbar.99 And in Woyak v'. Konieske,100 a man in the business of
selling and servicing cars for 38 years examined photographs of
defendant's car and then testified the collision was a "sideswipe." The
Minnesota Supreme Court held the admission of this testimony was
discretionary with the trial court.
Cases involving opinions as to the speed of colliding automobiles, based on an examination of the wrecked automobiles
or photographs thereof, involve an element of speculation and
conjecture not present in determining whether a car hit almost
broadside by the front end of another car was standing still or
moving. A person experienced in repairing damaged automobiles
may conceivably be able to determine from an examination of
an automobile, whether there was any movement sideways under
such circumstances ....

The explanation of the witness ...

thoroughly explored on cross examination. 10 1

was

C. Point of Impact
1. Lay Witnesses
Expectedly, the untrained witness is infrequently called upon to
ascertain the location of collision with reference to the roadway. Such
a witness is even less frequently successful over objection to questions
10
propounded to him.

2

If, however, the lay witness is able to give measurements of the
width of the highway and its several lanes, the width of the vehicles
and distance from curbing, the fact that the result amounts to fixation
10 3
of the point of impact is not objectionable.
2. Law Enforcement Witnesses
a. Wisconsin
We have earlier mentioned Andersen v. Andersen, 04 where the
testimony of the location of the cars with respect to the concrete based
solely upon examination of photographs and a drawing made by another officer was erroneously, but not prejudicially, admitted.
The more recent case of Milwaukee v. Bub'0 ° will impede the
willingness of many investigating policemen to pinpoint the location
of impact, particularly in prosecution for traffic violations. There the
court made it clear that a qualified expert could opine the position
99 148 Kans. 42, 80 P. 2d 4 (1938).
100 237 Minn. 213, 54 N.W. 2d 649 (1952).

Id., 54 N.W. 2d at 654.
Floeck v. Hoover, 52 N.Mex. 193, 195 P. 2d 86 (1948) ; Cheek v. Barnwell
Warehouse & Brokerage Co., 209 N.C. 569, 183 S.E. 729 (1936).
103 Gzetowski v. Hall Motor Exp., 25 N.J.S. 192, 95 A. 2d 759 (1953).
104 Note 48 supra.
105 18 Wis. 2d 216, 118 N.W. 2d 123 (1962).
10L
102

1964]
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of two vehicles at time of impact based upon damage to them, their
position after collision, and marks or absence of marks on the pavement and shoulders. 0 6 Justice Dieterich then said:
It takes a high degree of training, plus experience, to
become an expert on the complex problem of where an impact
occurs in an automobile accident. The testimony of police officer
Walters certainly does not qualify him as an expert witness.
Although the record discloses that Walters is an experienced
police officer, that in itself does not qualify him as a physicist or
engineer and without such knowledge his testimony can be given
no weight as to the point of impact...
b. Other Jurisdictions
Other states agree with Wisconsin in barring the conclusions of
officers as to the point of impact.'0 7 Sometimes this is because the
officer's proferred testimony is not based on his own conclusions, but
on hearsay statements of others.0 s In other cases, the admission, while
09
considered erroneous, is not prejudicial.
More recent decisions indicate a willingness on the part of courts
to permit the experienced officers to testify, where the jurors are not
able to easily infer the point of collision."' Where the testimony is
106 Making reference to Henthorn v. M.G.C. Corp., 1 Wis. 2d 180, 83 N.W. 2d
759 (1957).
107 Wolf V. State for Use of Brown, 173 Md. 103, 194 Atl. 832 (1937) ; State
v. Blazard, 103 Utah 113, 133 P. 2d 1000 (1943) ; Hadley v. Ross, 195 Okia.
89, 154 P. 2d 939 (1944) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Crane, 199 Miss. 69, 23 So. 2d
297 (1945) ; Kohler v. Stephens, 74 N.D. 655, 24 N.W. 2d 64 (1946) ; Beckman
v. Schroeder, 224 Minn. 370, 28 N.W. 2d 629 (1947); Hamre v. Conger, 209
S.W. 2d 242 (Mo. 1948); Delta Chevrolet Co. v. Waid, 51 So. 2d 443 (Miss.
1951); Danner v. Waters, 154 Neb. 506, 48 N.W. 2d 635 (1951); Gordon
v. Robinson, 210 F. 2d 192 (3d Cir. 1953) ; Giffen v. Ensign, 234 F. 2d 307
(3d Cir. 1955); Ryan v. Campbell "66" Express, Inc., 304 S.W. 2d 825 (Mo.
1957); Applegate v. Wilson, 156 Cal. App. 2d 330, 319 P. 2d 401 (1957);
Chester v. Schockley, 304 S.W. 2d 831 (Mo. 1957) ; Satterland v. Fieber, 91
N.W. 2d 623 (N.Dak. 1958) ; Padgett v. Buxton-Smith, 262 F. 2d 39 (10th
Cir. 1958) ; Grayson v. Williams Mercantile Company, 256 F. 2d 61 (10th Cir.
1958) ; Lee v. Terminal Transport Co., 269 F. 2d 97 (7th Cir. 1959) ; Biggs
v. Gottsch, 173 Neb. 15, 112 N.W. 2d 396 (1961); Gilbert v. Quinet, 91 Ariz.
29, 369 P. 2d 267 (1962); Presser v. Shull, 133 Ind. App. 553, 181 N.E. 2d
247 (1962).
08 Ribble v. Cook, 111 Cal. App. 2d 103, 245 P. 2d 593 (1952) ; Kalfus v. Fraze,
136 Cal. App. 415, 288 P. 2d 967 (1955); Johnson v. People's Cab Co., 386
Pa. 513, 126 A. 2d 720 (1956); Gray v. Woods, 84 Ariz. 87, 324 P. 2d 220

(1958).

109Hazelrigg Trucking Co. v. Duvall, 261 P. 2d 204 (Okla. 1953).
210 E.g, Een v. Consolidated Freightways, 120 F. Supp. 289 (D.N.D. 1954);
Lynch v. Bissell, 99 N.H. 473, 116 A. 2d 121 (1955); Grant v. Clark, 78
Idaho 412, 305 P. 2d 752 (1956); Tuck v. Buller, 311 P. 2d 212 (Okla.
1957); Brower v. Quick, 249 Iowa 569, 88 N.W. 2d 120 (1958); Gerberg v.
Crosby, 52 Wash. 792, 329 P. 2d 184 (1958); Zelayta v. Pac. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 104 Cal. App. 2d 716, 232 P. 2d 572 (1951) ; Kelso v. Independent
Tank Co., 348 P. 2d 855 (Okla. 1960); Ross v. Newsome, 289 F. 2d 209
(5th Cir. 1961); Hermansen v. Anderson Equipment Co., 174 Neb. 325, 117
N.W. 2d 791 (1962); L. C. McNelley, D-A Lubricant, Inc. v. Smith, 368
P. 2d 555 (Colo. 1962); Wells Truckways v. Cebrian, 122 Cal. App. 2d 666,
265 P. 2d 557 (1954). Other cases in which officers testified as to point of
impact are: Spotswood v. Dalious, 180 A. 2d 465 (1962) ; Flores v. Barlow,
354 S.W. 2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Pulse v. Jones, 218 S.W. 2d 553
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based on debris on the pavement, it has been held admissible, irrespective of the officer's qualifications."' But it is improper to ask the
officer to determine the point of impact, where the question relies
exclusively on past experience without specifying the facts obtaining
at the collision in issue."

2

3. "Scientific Expert" Witnesses
a. Wisconsin
The Wisconsin Supreme Court was careful to emphasize in Anderson v. Eggert,"' that the physics professors did not attempt to state
where the impact occurred.
But in Henthorn v. M.G. C. Corp.," 4 any impression that a properly
qualified expert could not testify as to the point of impact was dispelled.
There the court stated:
The defendants produced one Vik as a witness who is a
graduate civil engineer with much experience in the field of
traffic matters, including reconstructing accidents from the
physical facts. Objections to most of the questions asked of this
expert witness were sustained by the trial court on the ground
that they invaded the province of the jury. This is a field in which
trial courts are permitted to exercise fairly wide discretion.
Anderson v. Eggert (1940), 234 Wis. 348, 359, 291 N.W. 365.
We do not consider it would be error to permit a qualified expert, such as Vik, to state his opinion as to the position of the
two units at the time of impact based upon such facts as damage
to the vehicles, position of the units after the accident, and
marks, or absence of marks, on the pavement and shoulders." 5
As previously noted, Milwaukee v. Bub," 6 reaffirmed the stringent
qualifications that must be established before the expert witness can
testify as to the point of 'impact.
b. Other Jurisdictions
Despite the continued misgivings of many courts," 7 some recent
decisions indicate a willingness to readily admit expert testimony on
(Mo. 1949); Briggs v. Burk, 174 Kans. 440, 257 P. 2d 164 (1953); People
v. Haeussler, 260 P. 2d 8 (Cal. 1953)-this case is also of interest because
it permits mechanic to explode myth that speedometer needle will always

stop at speed at impact.
111 Nielsen v. Wessels, 247 Ia. 213, 73 N.W. 2d 83 (1955). Compare Reid v.
Humphreys, 210 Md. 178, 122 A. 2d 756 (1956).
112 Fisher v. Suko, 98 N.W. 2d 895 (N.D. 1959); contra, Robinson v. Morrison,
133 So. 2d 230 (Ala. 1961).
123

Note 63 supra.

1 Wis. 2d 180, 83 N.W. 2d 759 (1956).
15 Id. at 190, 83 N.W. 2d at 765.

1"

116

Note 105 supra.

21 E.g., Moniz v. Bettencourt, 24 Cal. App. 2d 718, 76 P. 2d 535 (1938); Ross
v. Stricker, 85 Ohio App. 56, 88 N.E. 2d 80 (1949); Carmody v. Alto, 251
Minn. 19, 86 N.W. 2d 692 (1957); Dickman v. Struble, 104 Ohio App. 44,
146 N.E. 2d 636 (1957); Venable v. Stockner, 200 Va. 900, 108 S.E. 2d 380
(1959); Waller v. So. Cal. Gas Co., 170 Cal. App. 2d 747, 339 P. 2d 577
(1959).
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the point of impact where the witness's qualifications are clearly
established. Lofton v. Agee"3 is illustrative.
4. Other Witnesses
Mechanics are sometimes permitted to state where a vehicle receives the brunt of an impact. 1 Others testify as to the place of impact
on the pavement.120 In Ison v. Stewart,121 the Colorado Supreme
Court said:
In an endeavor to ascertain the cause of, and circumstances
attending an accident such as is here involved, it would seem to
be logical and reasonable-where a proper foundation therefore
has been laid, to allow men who have years of experience in
repairing wrecked automobiles, who have had full opportunity
to make inspection, and who are acquainted with the conditions
their
resulting from an auto accident, to give in evidence
22
opinions of what occurred at the time of collision.
Some cases include the testimony of witnesses as to point of
impact without indicating the nature of their qualifications.123 Others
involve opinion evidence on the subject predicated on mere observation
24
on markings on the pavement.
D. Other Facets of Accident Reconstruction
1. Lay Witnesses
One need have no special qualifications, other than the sense of
sight, in order to testify as to observations, such as the length of
skidmarks 25 Sometimes observation of the actions of the cars during
collision and the marks on the highway therefrom permit a witness
26
to tell of their respective positions at impact.
But Schoen v. Plazd Express C0.12 7 is a vivid illustration of the
principle that mere circumstantial evidence in the form of lay observations of the wreckage, unaided by any expert interpretation of
118303

F. 2d 287 (8th Cir. 1962). See also Leeper v. Thornton, 86 Ariz. 242,

344 P. 2d 1101 (1959).

119 Finch v. Weiner, 109 Conn. 616, 145 Atl. 31 (1929) ; Alien v. Zickos, 37 Ala.

App. 361, 68 So. 2d 841 (1953).
220 Arkmo Lumber Co. v. Luckett, 201 Ark. 140, 143 S.W. 2d 1107 (1940)-no
qualifications stated. Compare Abbott v. Hayes, 92 N.H. 126, 26 A. 2d 842
(1942).
121 105 Colo. 55, 94 P. 2d 701 (1939).
1-= Id., 94 P. 2d at 702.
123 Sikes v. Wilson, 74 Ga. App. 415, 39 S.E. 2d 902 (1946); Royal Crown
Bottling Co. v. Stiles, 82 Ga. App. 254, 60 S.E. 2d 815 (1950) ; Kohl v. Marin,
346 Mich. 693, 78 N.W. 2d 621 (1956); Union Transports, Inc. v. Braun,
318 S.W. 2d 927 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958).
'12 4 Hann v. Brooks, 331 Ill. App. 535, 73 N.E. 2d 624 (1947).
125 Grossnickle v. Avery, 96 Ind. App. 479, 152 N.E. 288 (1926); Bowker v.
Ill. Elec. Co., 297 Pac. 615 (Cal. App. 1931); McWhorter Transfer Co. v.
Peck, 232 Ala. 143, 167 So. 291 (1936).
126 Lange v. Affleck 160 Md. 695, 155 Atl. 150 (1931) ; Johnston v. Peairs, 117
Cal. App. 208, 3 P. 2d 617 (1931); Lambert v. Caronna, 206 N.C. 616, 175
S.E. 303 (1934).
127206 S.W. 2d 536 (Mo. 1947).
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such observations, will not permit the issue to go to the jury. In
this case there was no witness to the collision, and the circumstantial
evidence was held insufficient to support a verdict of negligence in the
action for wrongful death.
2. Law Enforcement Witnesses
a. Wisconsin
In Jacobson v. Bryan,1 28 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the receipt in evidence over objection of an investigating officer's
report would be error. On such report in that case, was an item
designated "Manner of Collision." The category under this heading
included "Sideswipe" which bore the officer's check mark. The court
said:
The officer was no better qualified to draw conclusions
from what he saw after the collision than any person of ordinary
intelligence, and therefore was not an expert. And if he were
an expert and qualified to give an opinion as to whether the
collision was a "sideswipe" or an "angle collision" his report
would not be admissible in evidence, but to make his opinion
admissible12 9he would have to give it on the witness stand under
oath ....

The court then ruled that the receipt of the report in the Bryan
case was not error because the defendant's objection to the report
was general and did not specify the particular portion that was
objectionable. 130
Without citing Bryan, the supreme court adhered to its reasoning
in Cushing v. Meehan.1 31 There a police investigative report was offered and received into evidence without objection, was held to be part
of the record as evidence of the facts therein stated and was not limited
to the function of impeachment.
b. Other Jurisdictions
Occasionally a police officer is enabled to state his conclusion, such
as the cause of a mark on one of the vehicles involved in a collision,
because the objection is improperly directed to the competency of the
witness, and not to the inadmissability of the conclusion.' 32 If the objection is properly worded, it will bar testimony as to whether the officer
1 33
determined one driver had violated the other's right of way.
244 Wis. 359, 12 N.W. 2d 789 (1944).
Id. at 362, 12 N.W. 2d at 790.
2 The court relied on 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §18, at 332 (3d ed. 1940), and
Maxcy v. Peavey Publishing Co., 178 Wis. 401, 190 N.W. 84 (1922). It also
said that under the Wisconsin Statutes (presently Wis. STAT. §327.18 (1)
(1961)), such report was inadmissible in so far as it was a mere memorandum
of measurements and the physical facts observable by the officer.
131 7 Wis. 2d 30, 95 N.W. 2d 796 (1958).
132 Cornwell v. Highway Motor Freight Line, Inc., 152 S.W. 2d 10 (Mo. 1941).
133 Williams v. Gurwitz, 99 Cal. App. 2d 801, 222 P. 2d 673 (1950). But compare
MacGregor v. Bradshaw, 193 Va. 787, 71 S.E. 2d 361 (1952), where officer
permitted to state skidmarks indicated car was "out of control."
128
129

30
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When an officer testifies to the observation of skidmarks, there must
be at least a reasonable inference that they were made by one of the
vehicles involved in collision. 13 4 But where the car- have already been
removed from the scene, some cases yet hold the officer may state what
physical markings were on the highway. 135
In Coker v. Mitchell'3 6 a sheriff in Texas was permitted to testify
whether the speed of the defendant "was safe under the circumstances."
But a trained state police officer was not permitted to establish the
order in which two automobiles struck a truck. 3 7 Such an officer was
allowed to state that the damage done to a vehicle resulted from a collision with another car rather than hitting a tree.'3 8 But a deputy sheriff
could not state from his observation of a skid mark whether he thought
the plaintiff's brakes were defective. 39
3. "Scientific Expert" Witnesses
a. Wisconsin
In Nolup v. Skemp,140 a civil engineer was asked, as an expert witness, to testify from photographs where the center of the road was located. The trial court was held to have correctly ruled that the jury
could see and understand as much from the photograph as could the
engineer, and so the subject was not a matter for expert testimony.
Wojciuk v. U. S. Rubber

Co.'

4

1

appears to represent the extreme to

which the Wisconsin Supreme Court will abide by the ruling of the
trial court in excluding testimony of schooled, expert witnesses. There
the one-car collision resulted from a blowout of a tire. At trial plaintiffs
offered opinion testimony of a mechanical engineer tending to show that
the sudden decrease in air pressure in the tire resulted from breaks in
its sidewall, which in turn arose from a defect in the manufacturing
process. The Circuit Court of Milwaukee County excluded such testimony because it did not deem the witness qualified, although the latter
had worked for several companies where he examined defects in tires,
as well as studied adhesives, including rubber. The supreme court affirmed the trial court's ruling:
Although the decision was based upon Dr. Schmidt's lack of
experience with automobile tires, it was not based upon a supposed rule that practicalexperience is always an essential qualification of an expert witness. Such a rule would be erroneous.
[Emphasis supplied.]
134 Williams v. Graff, 194 Md. 516, 71 A. 2d 450 (1950). See also Thomas v.
Meyer, 150 Kans. 587, 95 P. 2d 267 (1939); Padgett v. Buxton-Smith Mercantile Company, 262 F. 2d 39 (10th Cir. 1958).
Massicot v. Nolan, 65 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1953). Compare Turcotta v. De
Witt, 332 Mass. 160, 124 N.E. 2d 241 (1954).
136 269 S.W. 2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
'37 Conway v. Hudspeth, 229 Ark. 735, 318 S.W. 2d 137 (1958).
138 Conn v. Young, 267 F. 2d 725 (2d Cir. 1959).
139 Van v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Idaho 539, 366 P. 2d 837 (1962).
140 7 Wis. 2d 462, 96 N.W. 2d 826 (1959).
141 19 Wis. 2d 224, 120 N.W. 2d 47 (1962).
'35
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In this case plaintiffs were attempting to establish, from expert examination of the tire, that it had been defectively manufactured and that its failure resulted from such defect or at least
had occurred in a manner which was a breach of alleged warranties. The ground which Dr. Schmidt's opinion was to cover
was peculiar to the manufacture, structure, and behavior of
rubber tires. We cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion
to decide that Dr. Schmidt's knowledge of general scientific and
mechanical engineering principles and his practical experience
with materials and products other than tires did not qualify him
which would aid the jury in determining the
to express opinions
1 42
facts of this case.

b. Other Jurisdictions
A professor of mechanical engineering has been permitted to testify
as to the type of force needed to break a drawbar connecting two freight
vans together, which was broken when a truck struck the rear of the
second trailer.1 3 There was also no error in admitting the testimony of
an engineert to the effect that debris from a car would, under the laws
44
of inertia and centrifugal force, travel forward of the point of impact.'
Experts cannot testify as to the reasonable speed of operating a
145
truck-trailer under icy conditions.
Where the manufacturer of the vehicle is sued on a breach of warranty-products liability theory, as a result of the failure of a hydraulic
brake system on a truck, experts may properly testify as to the cause of
the collision, based on their findings in inspecting the brake system. 4 6
4. Other Witnesses
A salesman of cars cannot testify that one is defective where he
admits he knows nothing of their mechanical construction. 47 A garageman can state that in his opinion the damage done to the front axle of
one car could not have been occasioned by its rear axle colliding with
another car.'148 Similarly, a service manager could state that the damage
done to a vehicle could only be caused by the steel bracket on the other
party's fender. 149 And a garageman could state that loose spokes caused
the collapse of a truck wheel. 150
But a state automobile inspector could not testify from a table he
developed from his own experiments conducted on a level, paved road.' 5 '
A witness has been permitted to testify as to equipment necessary
for safe operation of a truck, and that in his opinion it was overloaded
Id. at 231-32, 120 N.W. 2d at 51.
143Burch v. Valley Motor Lines, 78 Cal. App. 2d 834, 179 P. 2d 47 (1947).
144 Hazelrigg Trucking Co. v. Duvall, 261 P. 2d 204 (Okla. 1953).
45 Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Edwards, 277 S.W. 2d 475 (Ky. App. 1955).
146 Swillie v. General Motors Corp., 133 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 1961).
147 White Automobile Co. v. Dorsey, 119 Md. 251, 86 Atl. 617 (1913).
148 Crampton v. Diame, 6 S.W. 2d 686 (Ky. App. 1928).
3-

49 Mann's Executor. Leyman Motor Co., 224 Ky. 507, 28 S.W. 2d 956 (1930).

150 DeMorais v. Johnson, 90 Mont. 366, 3 P. 2d 283 (1931).
151 Caperon v. Tuttle, 100 Utah 476, 116 P. 2d 402 (1941). Cf. Welch v. McNeely,
269 S.W. 2d 871 (Mo. 1954).
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at the time of 'collision.1-2 Another was permitted to state the direction
53
the metal on a vehicle was moved as the result of a collision.2
An experienced automobile mechanic could state that from his examination of damage to the two vehicles, "the blow would have had to
have been at an angle of 20-30', or approximately the same angle the
54
car was in when I picked it up.'
But a mechanic could not testify as to the effect of "tight" brakes,
where his opinion was repudiated by an engineer employed by the au1 55
tomobile manufacturer.
In the widely-publicized case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Itc.,' 56 a! mechanic was allowed to answer in response to a hypothetical
question, that the unusual action of the steering wheel and front wheels
"must have been due to a mechanical defect or failure of something
from the steering wheel down to the front wheels, that something down
there had to drop off or break loose to cause the car to act in the manner
it did. ....

",157

III.

PROPER QUESTIONING OF WITNESSES

A. Establishing Qualifications
In a comprehensive discussion on the subject of opinion evidence,
Justice Wilkie of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kreyer v. Farmers'
Co-operativeLumber Co.,158 recently said:
Trial courts have wide discretion as to admitting opinion evidence of expert witnesses. Anderson v. Eggert (1940), 234 Wis.
348, 291 N.W. 365; Henthorn v. M.G.C. Corp. (1957), 1 Wis.
(2d) 180, 83 N.W. (2d) 759.
The principal rule on whether or not expert opinion evidence
should be received is stated in the Anderson Case, supra, where
the Court held, at page 361:
'Whether the testimony was properly received in this case
depends upon whether members of the jury having that knowledge and general experience common to every member of the
community would be aided in a consideration of the issues by
the testimony offered and received.'
Despite the liberal tenor of this test for the admission of opinion
testimony, trial lawyers are yet faced with the reluctance of some trial
courts to permit reconstructive testimony-and the deference accorded
their decisions by the supreme court. Wocuik 59 is a classic illustration, and shows that while practical experience is not, theoretically, the
152 Abbott v. Hayes, 92 N.H. 126, 26 A. 2d 842 (1942).
1534 Pasero v. Tacoma Transit Co., 35 Wash. 2d 97, 211 P. 2d 160 (1949).
15 Debert v. Ross Pattern & Foundry Development Co., Inc., 105 Ohio App.
264, 152 N.E. 2d 369 (1957).
155 Ford Motor Co. v. Fish, 335 S.W. 2d 712 (Ark. 1960).
156 32 N.J. 358, 161 A. 2d 69 (1960).
157 Id., 161 A. 2d at 98.
1589 18 Wis. 2d 67, 75, 117 N.W. 2d 646, 650 (1962).
25

Note 141 supra.
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s'ine qua non for the admission of opinion evidence, in reality, it is quite
essential.
But with the showing of some practical experience, albeit limited,
in the field of accident reconstruction, coupled with substantiation of
the witness's academic training, the Henthorn.6 ° and Kuze116' cases por62
tend well for the reconstructive witness. Storbakken v. Soderbarg1
and Leeper v. Thornton 6 manifest the results obtainable, upon proof
of qualifications and the making of a record through the testimony of
preceding witnesses upon which the opinion can be predicated.
B. Framing of Inquiry
Despite the popularity of the objection with veteran trial strategists,
the fact a witness is asked for opinion on an ultimate fact to be de64
termined by the jury, does not make it objectionable. The Kreyer'
case makes it patently clear that an expert may give an opinion on an
issue of ultimate fact but only in response to a hypothetical question.
Justice Wilkie there said that "... the key point in a hypothetical question is the facts that are assumed and form the premises. If these facts
fail in any important particular then necessarily the answer or conclusion that assumes the facts must fail.'

65

We may properly ask then, what facts must be included in the
hypothetical question. Justice Wilkie feels that "A hypothetical question need not assume as proved all facts which the evidence in the case
tends to prove, but only those which tend to be proved and on the basis
of which a correct answer is sought .... ,,166 In a more recent case dealing with medical opinion, Kreyer was relied on to justify the omission
from a question relating symptoms to employment, rather than the accident, the undisputed fact that the plaintiff had no symptoms prior to
accident. 67 Justice Currie indicated that only such facts as amounts to
a verity, not necessarily an undisputed fact, need be included in the
hypothetical question. The Sharp'6 s case seems to be somewhat of a
departure from the more stringent rule of the 1891 case of Vosburg v.
Putney. 6 9 But even before Vosburg, the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
through Justice Taylor had occasion to state in Quinn v. Higgins:170
160 Note 114 supra.
161 Note 3 supra.
162 Note 67 supra.
163 Note 72 supra.
164 Note 158 supra at 76, 117 N.W. 2d at 651; quoting Justice Marshall in Maitland v. Gilbert Paper Co., 97 Wis. 476, 484, 72 N.W. 1124, 1127 (1897).
165 Id. at 77, 117 N.W. 2d at 652.
166id. at 77-78, 117 N.W. 2d at 652; citing Sullivan v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S.
M. R. Co., 167 Wis. 518, 167 N.V. 311 (1918).
167 Sharp v. Milw. & S. T. Corp., 18 Wis. 2d 467, 118 N.W. 2d 905 (1963).
16s Ibid.
169 80 Wis. 523, 50 N.W. 403 (1891).
17063 Wis. 664, 670, 24 N.W. 482, 484-485 (1885), cited in the Kreyer case, supra
note 158.
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It may be true that the court ought not to allow hypothetical questions to be propounded to an expert witness which
are plainly outside of the case and based upon a statement of
facts as to which there is no pretense that they are proved by
the evidence in the case. The rule in that respect must be that,
in propounding a hypothetical question to the expert, the party
may assume as proved all facts which the evidence in the case
tends to prove, and the court ought not to reject the question on
the-ground that, in his opinion, such facts are not established by
the preponderance of the evidence. What facts are proved in the
case, when there is evidence tending to prove them, is a question
for the jury and not for the court. The party has the right to the
opinion of the expert witness on the facts which he claims to be
the facts of the case, if there be evidence in the case tending to
establish such claimed facts, and the trial judge ought not to reject the question because he may think such facts are not sufficiently established. [Emphasis supplied.]
What then are such facts that the evidence tends to prove and
which must be included in the question in order "to allow the expert
to provide a correct answer on the theory advocated by the questioner's
side of the case" ?171 Certainly the late Kuzel' 7 2 decision teaches the importance of establishing in the record through prior testimony the existence, or non-existence, of a fact so important that the expert opinion,
and more, the entire case, hinges upon it. And when the supreme court
speaks of the necessity for establishing vital facts, McGaw v. Wassman 7 3 tells us they will not permit those facts to be established through
the opinion of a preceding witness. In other words, a witness cannot
predicate his opinion, as to causation, for example, upon a previous
opinion. 17 4 But the witness who has first-hand knowledge of the facts
included in the question may yet express his opinion in the form of
175
hypothesis.
The experience of other jurisdictions indicates that a hypothetical
question can be asked a witness going to the reconstruction of the accident, which will withstand the standard "assumption of facts not in
evidence or omission of material facts" objections. In some cases the
appellate court will assume the witness had critical facts in mind, although they were not included in the question put to him. 7 6 In others,
such as the well-written Storbakken 77 decision, the court, following
Wigmore 7 1 will permit the expert witness some latitude in determining
'171Sharp v. Milw. & S. T. Corp., supra note 167, at 477, 118 N.W. 2d at 910,
3.7 Note 3 supra.
73 263 Wis. 486, 57 N.W. 2d 920 (1953). See also Briggs v. Minn. St. Ry. Co.,
52 Minn. 36, 53 N.W. 1019 (1892).
: 74Bucher v. Wis. Cent. R. Co., 139 Wis. 597, 120 N.W. 518 (1909).
1 Feldstein v. Harrington, 4 Wis. 2d 380, 90 N.W. 2d 566 (1958). Cf. Crozier
v. Minn. St. Ry. Co., 106 Minn. 77, 118 N.W. 256 (1908).
176 Coker v. Mitchell, 269 S.W. 2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
'7 Note 67 supra.
178 Note

69 supra.
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whether the facts incorporated in the hypothetical question are sufficient
to permit him to express his opinion thereon. Other courts, such as the
court of appeals in Kale v. Douthitt,"9 are so stringent regarding the
quality and quantum of evidence to be included in the opinion, that reconstruction testimony is for all practical purposes barred from use
therein.
But why should not the standards developed for guidance in the
formulation of hypothetical questions generally apply to reconstructive
testimony? If the question meets with objection of opposing counsel
because it and the evidence then in the record upon which it is predicated lack certain facts deemed essential by the objector, the trial court
has ample precedent upon which to rule that the missing facts can be
supplied to the expert on cross-examination,8 0 and that the witness
should be permitted to answer the question. This proposition assumes
such facts as are embraced in the question tend to be established by the
evidence as Kreyer'8' requires. (It should be noted that under a logical, though perhaps exaggerated, extension of Engstrom v. Dewcitz,

s2

the objector may be obliged to assist the propounder in the formulation
of the question.)
C. Forms of Hypothetical Questions
Personal experience teaches us that the practicing lawyer places great
store in that which has already endured judicial scrutiny. The best reported form of hypothetical question in the reconstruction of accident
field seems to be that in Storbakken,183 which we have previously
quoted.18 4 But there are others worth perusing. 85 And for the attorney
arming himself to bar the propounding of a reconstructive question,
the Kale 88 case is most helpful.
With no small degree of trepidation, the following outline is submitted to the readers. It, in substantially this form, withstood examination in personal use 8 7 in questioning a Marquette University Professor
of Physics. His testimony was calculated to prove that a blow at the
left rear of the plaintiff's automobile would not have a tendency to
throw him to the right of his driver's seat, under the laws of inertia.
1. (After name, address and date of birth given)
What is your profession?
.79Note 73 supra.
180 Compare Smalley v. City of Appleton, 75 Wis. 18, 43 N.W. 826 (1889), with

Delap v. Liebenson, 190 Wis. 73, 208 N.W. (1926).

181 Note 158 supra at 81, 117 N.W. 2d at 650.
182

18 Wis. 2d 421, 428, 118 N.W. 2d (1963).

183 Note 67 supra.
184 Note 68 supra.
185 See Jackson v. Vaughn, 204 Ala. 543, 86 So. 469 (1920) ; Brower v. Quick,

249 Iowa 569, 88 N.W. 2d 120 (1958); In re Armstrong Estate, 181 Kan.
171, 311 P. 2d 281 (1957).

188

Note 73 supra.

287Zabit v. Guffey, Racine County, Wisconsin, Circuit Court, case no. 60-123
(1961).
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2. Where are you employed?
3. For how long have you been so employed?
4. Where were you educated?
5. What degrees, if any, do you hold?
6. Have you had any professional experience other than that
received in your present capacity?
7. What does the study of physics embrace?
8. What does mechanics embrace?
9. What are the basic principles on which mechanics rests?
10. Can you explain the law of force? (at this stage the witness was furnished a blackboard.)
11. What is the scope of this law?
12. Do you drive an automobile-for how long?
13. Would the laws of force and momentum apply to a body
such as a moving automobile?
14. Would they apply to an object in a moving automobile,
including a human being?
15. Can you describe the application of the laws of force and
momentum to the body of a person driving an automobile
from the time such person enters his car, activates the ignition, and travels forward to the time he halts the forward
motion of his automobile?
16. Assume the following facts to be true in one hypothetical
questionAssume a forty-year old male in good health and athletic
is driving alone in a 1952 Ford station wagon automobile, in
excellent mechanical condition, in a southerly direction on a dry,
paved, 22 feet wide concrete public highway which inclines
slightly in a southerly direction, at a speed of 45 miles per hour,
or 67Y feet per second, on the 21st day of April, 1959, a clear,
sunny day, at 6:05 P.M.; further assume that such a person observes a 1959 Rambler Ambassador automobile positioned in the
south-bound lane of such a highway at a distance of at least 100
feet from his 1952 Ford station wagon automobile, that such person thereby attempts to engage the brake pedal of his automobile
in an effort to decelerate but fails to do so much as activate the
brake lights of the car, although they are in good operating order,
and fails to change the direction of travel of his automobile, with
the result that his automobile collides virtually head-on with the
1959 Rambler Ambassador automobile, causing the 1952 Ford
station -wagon automobile to be propelled backwards, or in a
northerly direction and sustaining damage to the front ends -of
both automobiles of such nature as I show you in these photographs marked "Defendant,

-

, Exhibits .-

and

1"; are all of these assumptions clear to you?
Now, keeping all of these assumptions in your mind and
based on your study and research, your experience and your
general knowledge of the principles of mechanics, do you have
an opinion, based on reasonable scientific certainty of the nature
of the motion relative to his automobile, the driver of the 1952
automobile had during the assumed events I have just described?
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What is your opinion? You may use the blackboard to illustrate, if you wish.
What factors did you use in reaching your opinion; will you
explain the application of each of these factors in arriving at your
opinion?
Further questions were then asked the witness regarding the effect
of a glancing blow to the left corner of the rear bumper of the '52 Ford,
and whether its occupant would be thrown to the right side of the car
when struck such a glancing blow.
IV.

OTHER AREAS OF EXPERT TESTIMONY IN WISCONSIN NEGLIGENCE
LAW

A cursory examination of the digests 8 s and cumulative supplements
reveals that opinion evidence bearing upon the issues of negligence is
permitted in a variety of fact situations. For example, Potter v.
Schleck8 9 permitted a mechanical engineer to testify as to climatology
and that the amount of precipitation on the day of a fall could not
have reached the sidewalk through a downspout in liquid form. In
Drott Tractor Co. v. Kehrein,190 an engineer was permitted to testify
as to the proper method of shoring a trench. Kreyer"9 ' featured the
testimony of a "fire expert."
In fact the Wisconsin Supreme Court said at an early date:
The scope of expert evidence is not restricted to matters of
science, art, or skill, but extends to any subject in respect to
which one may derive by experience special and peculiar knowledge ....

192

The scope of that evidence permitted is shown by the cases cited
in the footnote.

1 93

1888 CALLAGHAN'S WISCONSIN DIGEST, Evidence §§1142-1263 (1950); 7 WiscoN-

SIN DIGEST, Evidence §§470-574 (1941).

1899 Wis. 2d 12, 100 N.W. 2d 559 (1959). Cf. Frion v. Coren, 13 Wis. 2d 300,

108 N.W. 2d 563 (1960).

190275 Wis. 320, 18 N.W. 2d 500 (1956).

191 Note 158 supra.
'29Zarnik v. C. Reiss Coal Co., 133 Wis. 290, 301, 113 N.W. 752, (1907); citing
Hamann v. Milw. B. Co., 127 Wis. 550, 106 N.W. 1081 (1906); Maitland v.
Gilbert P. Co., 97 Wis. 476, 72 N.W. 1124 (1897); Lyon v. Grand Rapids,
121 Wis. 609, 99 N.W. 311 (1904).
193 Suess v. J. S. Stearns Lumber Co., 143 Wis. 609, 128 N.W. 443 (1910)cause of breaking of steam pipe; Karlen v. Hadinger, 147 Wis. 78, 132 N.W.
591 (1911)-effect of fodder on quality of milk; Vater v. Cornelius, 59 Wis.
615, 18 N.W. 474 (1884)-whether horse is foundered; Brabbits v. Chi. &
N.W. Ry. Co., 38 Wis. 289 (1875)-effect of leaky throttle on operation;
Fitts v. Cream City R. Co., 59 Wis. 323, 18 N.W. 186 (1884)-approved use
of streetcar; Griffen & Shelly Co. v. Joannes, 80 Wis. 601, 50 N.W. 785 (1891)
-condition of oranges; Whitney v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 27 Wis. 327 (1870)
-susceptibility of wool to spontaneous combustion; E. L. Chester Co. v.
Wis. Power & Light Co., 211 Wis. 158, 247 N.W. 861 (1933)-cause of gas
explosion; Schweiker v. John R. Davis Lbr. Co., 145 Wis. 632, 130 N.W.
508 (1911)-whether sprocket should have been guarded; Smith v. Atco Co.,
6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N.W. 2d 697 (1959)-cause of death of mink; Scaramelli &
Co., Inc. v. Courteen Seed Co., 194 Wis. 520, 217 N.W. 298 (1928)-value
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CONCLUSION

If, as we know from Anderson v. Eggert,19 4 expert opinion evidence is to be permitted whenever it would assist the jury, its use should
become more prevalent in automobile litigation. When courts frankly
admit that contrary inferences can be drawn from the physical facts, 195
the testimony of a person schooled and experienced in the analysis of
those facts seems a welcome supplement to the present practice of casting the puzzle to the jury without assistance. And there have been and
will be instances where the courts will not permit even the jury to
speculate as to cause and liability solely upon circumstantial evidence.1 9
It therefore appears that despite past expressions of skepticism
directed towards reconstructive testimony, 97 there is no difference in
kind between the testimony of the professionally educated witness in
the fields of physics and engineering, and that of the medical witness.
Anyone experiencing the spectacle of the disparity in opinion constantly developing between men of medicine representing different
parties in a lawsuit should agree with the dissent of Justice Jones from
Mississippi.

gs

The trial judge has been accorded the discretion for necessary control of the subject of reconstructive evidence. That control should not
amount to a blanket prohibition.

of clover seed; Carle v. Nelson, 145 Wis. 593, 130 N.W. 467 (1911)-value
of tobacco; Jackson v. Wis. Tel. Co., 88 Wis. 243, 60 N.W. 430 (1894)conducting of lighting.

194 Note 63 supra.

193 See opinion of Justice Hallows in the Evien case, supra note 30; and Richards v. Eaves, 273 Ala. 120, 135 So. Zd 384 (1961).
196 The writers submit Schoen v. Plaza Express Co., 206 S.W. 2d 536 (Mo. 1947)
as a prime example of a situation where reconstructive testimony might have
been advisable.
'97 E.g., Fishman v. Silva, 166 Cal. App. 1, 2 P. 2d 473 (1931) ; Moniz v. Bettencourt, 24 Cal. App. 2d 718, 76 P. 2d 535 (1938); Hagan Storm Fence Co.
v. Edwards, 148 So. 2d 693 (Miss. 1933).
198 Notes 77 and 78 supra.

